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Abstract 
 Paez is an Argentine brand of espadrilles, created by three friends who wanted to give 
a twist to the traditional Argentine espadrille. The brand was taken to Portugal by two 
Portuguese students who learned about it during their exchange program in Argentina. 
 Paez was well accepted by the consumers and soon began to spread around the country. 
When Paez opened their second store in Lisbon, they decided to open it in a newly revitalized 
commercial area called Príncipe Real. They soon realized that Príncipe Real wasn’t being as 
successful as they expected, because the area wasn’t being as advantageous as they thought it 
would be. 
 With this, Carlos Coutinho, Paez’s CEO, had to make a decision. Either they would 
open a new store in Chiado and leave Príncipe Real’s store open, or they would move the store 
from Príncipe Real to Chiado. 
The decision required a full analysis of both options. Coutinho had to evaluate the 
profitability of each option by analysing two main possible causal factors: the consumer 
behavior in both a broad and a location related perspective, in order to conclude if having both 
stores open would be inefficient due to proximity and similarity of market segments reached; 
and the total balance of both options to conclude whether the investment needed to keep both 
stores open would be worth it and compensated by the profit coming from Príncipe Real. 
Students are presented with Paez’s and consumers’ facts and figures in order to make 
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 In September 2014, Carlos Coutinho, Paez partner and CEO, was at home preparing his 
speech for the other two partners. He was anxious about the decision he had to make, pacing 
back and forth in the room. The numbers would take a great part on his decision, he had to 
analyze them thoroughly in order to know exactly which way to go. 
 Paez had opened a store in Príncipe Real in November 2013 and it wasn’t being as 
successful as they expected. They had to open a store elsewhere in order to follow their growth, 
and Chiado was the right place. 
 The huge doubt was if they were going to open a third store and drop the project which 
he had tirelessly worked on - opening the store in Príncipe Real. Or if they were going to Chiado 
and keep Príncipe Real’s store open as it could still be fruitful, since it had only been open for 
less than a year. 
 Would they have to invest in a new store? Or could they simply move from Príncipe 
Real to Chiado? Would it be worth it to make a much greater investment to keep Príncipe Real’s 
store open? Would Príncipe Real’s store profit be worth the investment? 
 Coutinho had to put his emotions apart in order to make the right decision as his position 




 The espadrilles – or alpargatas – are believed to descend from the Egyptian sandals.1 
They were taken to Argentina by Basque immigrants and then became an icon of the people 
from rural areas all over Argentine as they were comfortable, simple and had a resistant sole, 
ideal for farming and other country jobs (see Exhibit 1). 
                                                 
1 www.paezusa.com. 2010. The History of the Alpargata. [ONLINE]. Available at: 
http://www.paezusa.com/history.html. [Accessed 12 May 15]. 
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The espadrille quickly spread around the country and it “became the everyday shoe for 
Argentina. For people who valued a breathable and glove-like shoe, the alpargata was the 
perfect fit.”2 
 In 2006, three Argentine friends decided to give a twist to this simple and comfortable 
shoe and embraced the challenge of making it become a fashion icon. Their rapid growth was 
encouraging and motivating and they started investing in expansion through deals with 
representatives in different countries. 
 In 2011 they opened their own plant in Argentina employing over 25 workers and all of 
them were Argentine. But by 2012, Paez started producing in China as well, as it seemed the 
best way to get the product distributed around the world, being able to attain much lower costs. 
And as Asia leads the market prices in production, it was a clever move. In China the average 
export price of one pair of shoes is less than $4,00 USD (see Exhibit 2), which is abnormally 
cheap when compared to America or Europe (see Exhibit 3). 
With an initial investment of $5.000 USD, Paez spread to 30 countries and has over 12 




 It was late November 2008 and Ricardo Ortigão Ramos and Francisco Penim, two 
Portuguese students, were living the experience of an exchange semester in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. It was mid spring and the sun was already taking control of the Porteños’3 mood, 
filling them with joy and providing them long days at the beach. 
 One day, during a business course class, Ramos and Penim heard of an Argentine brand 
called Paez that had somehow reinvented the famous Argentine espadrille, very common 
among the argentine gauchos4. By that time, Paez’s espadrilles could already be seen on a lot 
                                                 
2 www.paezusa.com. 2010. The History of the Alpargata. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.paezusa.com/history.html. [Accessed 12 May 15]. 
3 Porteño is the name given to inhabitants of Buenos Aires. 
4 Gauchos are the Argentine equivalent of the North American cowboys. Through their journeys across Patagonia 
and the Andes, they disseminated the shoe. 
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of people’s feet in Buenos Aires’ beaches and that aroused interest in these two students. They 
decided to learn more about the company, and by entering their website they found an 
“exportation contacts” link. 
Ramos and Penim were both studying business, therefore they had the tools and mindset 
needed to put some ideas together on paper and decide whether the product would be suitable 
for Portugal or not. After a brainstorming along with some discussion, they started writing an 
e-mail and preparing a short presentation to send to the company. Their aim was to demonstrate 
that the product was adequate for Portugal and that, consequently, they were interested in 
exporting it.  
They arranged a first meeting, and that meeting led to fortnightly meetings to set every 
detail on how they would implement the company in Portugal, and it ended up in an agreement. 
Having finished their exchange period, Ramos and Penim were now entrepreneurs by 
definition, they weren’t regular students anymore, they were going back home with a purpose 
– to help “build the most beloved brand in the world”5. 
With a small investment, mainly from their parents, they bought the first thousand pairs 
of espadrilles. They started selling door-to-door with their car’s trunk as the showroom; selling 
to everybody that would call them or e-mail them asking to see, to try or to buy a pair. They 
soon began to make themselves present at music festivals and any kind of event that would 
mildly relate to the concept and involve their target audience. 
Soon after, they realized that studying and developing a company at the same time 
would be a tough job. And that was where Carlos Coutinho came on the scene. And he did not 
only appear at the right time, he was also the most indicated person to join the company. 
Ramos met Coutinho during one of Ramos’ door-to-door sales to a common friend. 
Coutinho demonstrated a huge interest in the brand and immediately put himself available to 
help with anything they needed. 
Coutinho had worked at Nike as a sales representative for two years6, thus he did not 
only have experience in the footwear industry, he also had the contacts needed to boost a 
                                                 
5 Paez’s vision statement 
6 Fabulous Letters From a Lisboner. 2011. Paez Portugal: What You need to Know. [Online] Available 




business like this and start making room for it on some store shelves. He was working at an 
agricultural family business at that moment and saw an opportunity to be part of something big. 
Ramos and Penim, before long, invited Coutinho to join the company as a third partner. 
Marketing and Brand Awareness 
In the beginning, as a start-up on a low budget, Paez could not invest in big expensive 
marketing campaigns. However, they still had to make their way to the consumers’ minds, they 
had to attain visibility and brand awareness. On a low budget, there’s not much of a choice to 
be made regarding these issues. They had to be as cost effective as possible disseminating their 
message and they had to do it mostly by themselves. 
 Word of mouth was the key. It was costless and efficient as the product was good 
enough, innovative enough and it was becoming trendy. Ramos said: “It was mainly word of 
mouth, but we definitely benefitted from the fact that the espadrilles became a fashion icon, 
especially among women.”7 
 They decided to travel along the Portuguese coast during the summer selling espadrilles 
and spreading the word, searching for brand awareness. To do so, they painted corkboards with 
Paez logo, they made expositors out of corkboards, and invested in some merchandising items 
such as flags and t-shirts. 
 In order to make advertisements without having to pay the enormous amounts of money 
that the media channels usually charge, they tried to reach out to newspapers and negotiate an 
exchange for espadrilles. They had a one page ad in the newspaper Destak, by agreeing on 
exchanging it for a certain amount of Paez’s espadrilles. 
 Another form of attaining brand awareness that they used and proved itself to be 
effective was to associate themselves to athletes and other celebrities by offering them pairs of 
espadrilles. The public figures would then post pictures on the social media platforms – 
Facebook and Instagram, mainly - using Paez’s product, so the celebrities’ fans and followers 
would get to know the brand. 
                                                 
7 Coutinho, Carlos, and Ricardo Ortigão Ramos. "Empresa Com Os Pés Coloridos Mas Bem Assentes Na Terra." 
Interview by Emídio Marques, J, 2013. Diário De Notícias, [Online]. Available at: 




 In 2010, Ramos, Penim and Coutinho decided to buy a van for the summer sales around 
the coast and to take to any event where it was possible to use the vehicle as a store. This worked 
almost as a marketing activation campaign, as the customers felt related to the environment and 
mood lived by the owners of the company – they were young, relaxed and adventurous, exactly 
as their target audience (see Exhibit 6). 
 
Evolution and decision making 
In 2014, Paez already had two own stores in Lisbon. The company’s fast growth was 
taking them to new levels every year and they were trying to respond effectively to the 
consumer demand. They already counted on a management team of five members (see Exhibit 
7). 
The second store, in Príncipe Real, opened in November 2013 and it was a big move for 
Paez. They needed another store and chose Príncipe Real because a new shopping gallery – 
Embaixada - had opened there, and it seemed an appropriate place to open a new store. 
Príncipe Real had been evolving as a commercial kernel. Eastbanc Portugal - an 
investment, promotion and property management company - bought nearly 20 buildings in the 
area to revitalize it from a commercial standpoint (see Exhibit 8). 
Catarina Lopes from Eastbanc stated: 
"Príncipe Real is cosmopolitan and simultaneously an area where you can 
breathe a neighborhood environment. [It is] fully transversal in urban cultures, 
age groups and socio-economic levels. These characteristics are reflected and 
originated in the shopping street where you can find authentically Portuguese 
innovation and the "trendy-chic" spurred by a new generation of national 
entrepreneurs." 8 
 
 They didn’t know if they should go to an established commercial area, or take the 
risk and go to a newly revitalized area. They thought of opening the store in Chiado, but 
as the rents were way higher and they had the chance of being associated to this new 
                                                 
8 Lancastre, Pedro, Araújo, P and Empis, M, 2014. Lisbon Street Shopping – A Afirmação Do Comércio De Rua 
Em Lisboa. Rep. JLL - Jones Lang Lasalle. Available at: http://www.jll.pt/portugal/pt-
pt/Research/JLL_Portugal_%20Lisbon%20Street%20Shopping_PORT.pdf?8019896d-3777-43f9-a59a-
ed8320cf422b [Accessed 01 May 2015] 
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entrepreneurial commercial area – Príncipe Real – they decided to take the risk and opt 
for the one that could provide them differentiation and association to something new. 
Paez, supposedly, was on the right track. But that was not how things played out. The 
store ended up not being enough to follow their growth and it hadn’t been as successful as they 
thought it would be. 
Therefore they needed to open a new store. And this time, they decided to open it in 
Chiado as it was an established centre of fashion brand stores in Lisbon and a traditional 
shopping place. They wouldn’t take the risk again, they wanted to be placed where it was safer 
for them. 
“Chiado combines the Portuguese history and tradition with the new trends 
and concepts, being considered a trendy, fashion and vibrant zone [of Lisbon]. 
Chiado is the trendiest fashion and cosmopolitan area of the capital, where 
tradition and modernity, national and international brands, the premium stores 
and mass-market, tourists and weekenders all live together. Demand has 
exceeded by far the offer and who wants to have a store here will have to pay 
the highest rent in the market.”9 
In Chiado they would have a slightly larger store, they would pay 3.000€ a month in 
rent instead of the more comfortable 950€ they were paying in Príncipe Real and they would 
have to have more employees working there (see Exhibit 9). 
 
The Consumer 
Paez’s customers have changed a lot since the company opened in Portugal. These 
changes took place due to several reasons. One of the main reasons was the way they entered 
the market. Paez entered in Portugal with two young boys selling canvas shoes from their car’s 
trunk. It was quite obvious that their image would probably not entirely match the one they 
                                                 
9 Lancastre, Pedro, Araújo, P and Empis, M, 2014. Lisbon Street Shopping – A Afirmação Do Comércio De Rua 
Em Lisboa. Rep. JLL - Jones Lang Lasalle. Available at: http://www.jll.pt/portugal/pt-
pt/Research/JLL_Portugal_%20Lisbon%20Street%20Shopping_PORT.pdf?8019896d-3777-43f9-a59a-
ed8320cf422b [Accessed 01 May 2015] 
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would want to achieve in the long run. But this happened because Ramos and Penim brought 
Paez to Portugal with a low investment. And regardless all this, they thrived. 
 When they were selling door-to-door, they would almost only sell to friends, and friends 
would tell friends and the average consumer would become the same age as they were, with a 
similar lifestyle and would probably be of the same social class. 
 This was necessary, as word of mouth was their communication channel, but it was also 
risky, as people could get the wrong perception of the product. That could possibly lead them 
to a point of no return in which they wouldn’t be able to reach all their potential customers. 
Consequently, they had to slowly start reaching other consumers and change their perception 
within the consumers’ minds. 
Age 
Paez has a huge segment of clients between 46 and 55 years old, they represent around 
45% of Paez consumers. Although there might be consumers between these ages that are not 
buying for themselves - but as gifts to younger people - it is still a huge sector. And the segment 
from 18 to 30 years old represents roughly 35% of their clients. The consumers are already 
perceiving the espadrilles as a general product and not as a youth trendy product (see Exhibit 
10). 
Gender 
 Paez owes 70% of their sales to the feminine customers (see Exhibit 11). It is curious 
that a unisex shoe becomes trendier to one of the genders without an apparent reason. But 
Coutinho thinks this has to do with their communication approach through the social networks 
and the evolution of the collections – patterns, colors – being more adapted to women. 
Annual Income 
Paez is also having a shift regarding the social and economic situation of its average 
consumer. Paez are no longer associated to an upper middle class of the Portuguese society, the 
consumers are equitably dispersed along all levels of income with the highest number of people 
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being inserted in a lower level of income – between 10.001€ and 20.000€ per year - than the 
average salary in Portugal10 (see Exhibit 12). 
Loyalty 
Paez’s consumers are loyal to the brand, probably due to its image and relationship with 
the customer. Diogo Borges, the Marketing Director, said: “We care about the consumer a lot. 
We try to address any issue as fast as we can, as we think bonding with the consumers is a way 
to reach our vision, building customer loyalty throughout the path.” 
Around 91% of the consumers are happy with their purchase and would buy Paez again. 
It is also important to denote that more than half of Paez consumers have already bought two 
or more pairs. This shows that the customers are happy with, and loyal to the brand (see Exhibit 
13 and 14). 
 
The Portuguese Market 
Portuguese footwear industry overview 
The footwear industry in Portugal surpassed major barriers when Portugal joined the 
EEC11 in 1986.  
“Few believed that an obsolete industry, situated in semi-rural areas and run by 
entrepreneurs, with [an education as low as] the fourth grade, would be able to survive 
the ‘test of modernization’. Today the Portuguese footwear is at the forefront of 
technique, being able to produce cutting-edge fashion, disputing with Italy the lead in 
world prices and exporting 71 million pairs of shoes per year” 12 
                                                 
10 The average monthly income in Portugal is 911,5€ -  
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Sal%C3%A1rio+m%C3%A9dio+mensal+dos+trabalhadores+por+conta+de+out
rem+remunera%C3%A7%C3%A3o+base+e+ganho-857 
11 European Economic Community - was an economic union created by the Treaty of Rome of 1957. It is currently 
named EU (European Community). 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Economic_Community [Accessed 30 April 2015]. 
 
12 Carvalho, M, 2013. A história de uma indústria condenada que se tornou um modelo para Portugal. Publico, 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.publico.pt/temas/jornal/a-historia-de-uma-industria-condenada-que-se-tornou-
um-modelo-para-portugal-27262596 [Accessed 28 April 2015]. 
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Portugal is one of the top exporters worldwide (see Exhibit 3) and in 2013 produced 
footwear equivalent to nearly 1,9 billion euros. This industry in Portugal is composed of 1350 
companies that employ around 35 thousand people (see Exhibit 15). 
 
Beach footwear segment and competitors 
 It is important to refer that when Paez entered the market, the espadrilles were perceived 
as beach footwear. Ramos stated: “When we entered the market, I believe people thought Paez’s 
espadrilles were too comfortable to be used on a daily basis”. But they are now less and less 
being considered as so. 
The beach footwear segment doesn’t have much variety, it only includes flip flops and 
espadrilles as main products, since these are the ones people buy the most to use specifically as 
beachwear. 
As Paez can still be considered to be, at least, partially inserted in the beach footwear 
market segment, there are 5 main competitors to be considered, being one of them the 
representation of the mass production fashion brands that sell espadrilles. 
 The four main brands that compete with Paez are: Toms, Moza Swazi, Maz and 
Havaianas. The fifth is composed of brands such as: H&M, Zara, Seaside, Springfield and 
Primark. All these brands sell espadrilles but all of them have different price ranges, different 
qualities, different materials and some have different target audiences (Exhibit 16 and 17). It 
is important to note that Borges, the company’s Marketing Director  stated: “We can’t keep 
track of the size of the market because it grows every day and there are already lots of brands 
out there that we haven’t yet heard of. But I can tell we have around 70% market share”. 
 As aforementioned, Paez had a lucky entrance in the market as the espadrille was 
already being recognized as a fashion icon, but with success comes competition, and that’s 
exactly what happened. 
 Toms are Paez’s most direct and biggest competitor on a worldwide level; they sell 
really similar espadrilles, they value innovation, they bet on comfort and they associate 
themselves to social causes – for each pair of Tom’s sold, they offer another pair to a child in 
need. In Portugal they are not a major threat, since they are only sold in a few reseller stores. 
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 Moza Swazi and Maz are new to the market, thus not being a huge threat for Paez as 
well. But still, they sell the same product, so they are considered possible future threats. Maz is 
a Brazilian brand and Moza Swazi is Portuguese. Moza Swazi is trying to find its place on the 
market by focusing its differentiation on the design; they associate themselves to Africa, and 
use African patterns on the espadrilles (Moza stands for Mozambique and Swazi for 
Swaziland). 
 As indirect competitors to the espadrille, the ones that stand out are flip flops. And the 
main brand selling flip-flops is Havaianas. When Paez’s was only associated and referred to as 
a beach shoe, Havaianas were a huge threat. When Paez entered the Portuguese market, the 
flip-flops were already well established and Havaianas was controlling the market. 
 Havaianas has a vast range of products in the beach footwear segment and although 
they also sell espadrilles, their flip flops’ category is the most threatening for Paez. When a 
person decides which kind of footwear to use to go the beach, they make a choice between 




 Coutinho had to make a decision considering both the financial and the location analysis 
of Chiado and Príncipe Real. He had to make sure his decision was only based upon facts.  
 He had two options: 
 Opening a third store in Chiado 
 Moving Príncipe Real’s store to Chiado 
The new store in Chiado would need renovations that would cost them quite a slice of 
the whole investment, but Coutinho was aware of the fact that keeping both stores open would 
have an increment on the fixed costs – namely employees and the rent -, and that could be 
determinant in choosing which way to go. 
Opening a third store in Chiado 
 By opening a third store (leaving Príncipe Real’s store open), they would have to make 
a larger investment, but they would have three stores, which means more exposure - it works 
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as publicity and may be perceived as sustainable growth - and would provide more revenue. 
Even though Príncipe Real’s store wasn’t going as expected, it was still profitable, and opening 
a new store would add more revenues, hence more profit to Paez’s total balance. 
 But he then started questioning himself if the fact that Príncipe Real and Chiado were 
so close to each other (see Exhibit 18) and Chiado was much more seen as a commercial area13, 
could implicate something in this equation – maybe the people that went to Príncipe Real also 
frequented Chiado. And he had to analyze if the difference in investment would be worth it (see 
Exhibit 20). 
 
Moving Príncipe Real’s store to Chiado 
 Moving Príncipe Real’s store to Chiado could, as opposed to the other option, show the 
consumers that the store in Príncipe Real wasn’t being that successful and that could be 
translated in Paez being going through a not-so-good moment. And there was a risk of, in case 
Príncipe Real and Chiado had totally different consumers, they’d be losing a slice of the market. 
 By moving the store they wouldn’t have to invest in new furniture and exhibitors, they 
would only have to pay the transportation costs to move it to Chiado (see Exhibit 21). But they 
would also be losing the profit from Príncipe Real. 
 
Conclusion 
 Coutinho had his hands tied, he had to make a decision and couldn’t risk making the 
wrong one. Ramos and Penim were expecting a detailed analysis and a complete one, so Paez 
wouldn’t be losing money neither on the short, nor the long-run. 
 He had gathered all the needed information and had one day to make the decision and 
prepare the speech. If this went wrong, he would be responsible for it. 
  
                                                 
13 As it is way older as a commercial site than Príncipe Real and has an area of stores five times greater than 
Príncipe Real. Source: JLL’s report - Lisbon’s Street Shopping - http://www.jll.pt/portugal/pt-
pt/Research/JLL_Portugal_%20Lisbon%20Street%20Shopping_PORT.pdf?8019896d-3777-43f9-a59a-








Exhibit 2 - Average Export Price by Continent 





Exhibit 3 – World Top 15 Footwear Exporters (in value) -2011 
 





Exhibit 4 – Paez presence around the World 




Exhibit 5 – Paez evolution throughout the years (2006 – 2012) 










Exhibit 7 – Paez Management Team 
 
Source: Data provided by the company 
 
Exhibit 8 – Príncipe Real’s main stores opening per year (1986 – 2014) 
 
 






Exhibit 9 – General Data about the company 
 








Exhibit 10 – Age distribution from Paez buyers  
























Espadrilles Total wages Chiado
Price 35,0 €            Hourly Salary 5,00 €             
COGS* 12,0 €            Working hours/employee 8
Contribution Margin 23,0 €            Days/month 22
*Cost of Goods Sold Number of employees 5
Total wages 4.400,00 €    
Average sales/month (quantity)
Príncipe Real 400 Total wages Príncipe Real
Chiado 1300 Hourly Salary 5,00 €             
Working hours/employee 8
Rent Days/month 22
Chiado 3.000 €          Number of employees 2,5




Exhibit 11 – Gender distribution from Paez buyers 
 
Source: Survey conducted by the case author 
 
 













Annual Income distribution Paez buyers
(>26 years old)
 
Only people with a stable income were considered, hence the age limit. 










Exhibit 13- How many pairs of Paez espadrilles have you bought? 









Would you buy Paez espadrilles again?
 










Exhibit 15 – Portuguese Footwear Industry Trend (2006 – 2013) 





Exhibit 16 – Competitors products 
 






Exhibit 17 - Range of espadrilles’ prices from the main players within the 














Source: Analysis by the case author with data available on each company’s website 
 






Exhibit 19 – Occupied Area and type of store distribution in Chiado and 
Príncipe Real 
 







Exhibit 20 – Incurred costs with opening a 3rd store (keeping Príncipe Real’s 
store open) 
 





Renovations 50.000 €                 
Furniture 20.000 €                 
Exhibitors 5.000 €                   
Chiado's Rent 3.000 €                   




Exhibit 21 – Incurred costs with moving the store from Príncipe Real to 
Chiado 
. 





Exhibit 22 – Purposes for which people buy Paez’s espadrilles 
 







To use on a daily-basis
To take to the beach
To use at home
To take to the swimming pool
Other
Fixed Costs
Renovations 50.000 €        
Transportation 1.000 €           
Chiado's rent (monthly) 3.000 €           
- P. Real's Rent (monthly) 950 €              
Employees Chiado (monthly) 4.400 €           




Exhibit 23 – Rank question (1 being most valuable and 5 least valuable) 
regarding beach footwear characteristics 
 
Source: Survey conducted by the case author 
 
Exhibit 24 – Rank question (1 being most valuable and 5 least valuable) 





Source: Survey conducted by the case author 
 
Exhibit 25 –Distribution of people that go to Chiado to shop and not to shop 
Source: Survey conducted by the case author 
Characteristics when buying espadrilles 1 2 3 4 5
Comfort 61% 33% 4% 2% 0%
Price 22% 24% 26% 20% 8%
Quality/Durability 8% 23% 44% 22% 3%
Ease of putting on/taking off 6% 20% 19% 42% 12%
Store location 3% 0% 7% 13% 77%
Characteristics when buying beach footwear 1 2 3 4
Comfort 58% 30% 11% 1%
Price 14% 31% 32% 23%
Quality/Durability 7% 14% 42% 37%





People that go to Chiado…
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Source: Survey conducted by the case author 
 
Exhibit 27 – Distribution of people that go to Príncipe Real to shop and go to 
Chiado to shop and not to shop 
 














Exhibit 28 – Monthly sales for each situation 
 
  





Loss in Sales from Príncipe Real 200
Chiado 1100
Monthly Sales Príncipe Real
Monthly Sales 7.000,0 €                
- COGS 2.400,0 €-                
Profit from Sales (monthly) 4.600,0 €                
Monthly Sales Chiado
Monthly Sales 38.500,0 €             
- COGS 13.200,0 €-             
Profit from Sales (monthly) 25.300,0 €             
Opening 3rd Store
Average sales/month (quantity)
Loss in Sales from Príncipe Real 400
Chiado 1300
Monthly Sales Príncipe Real
Monthly Sales 14.000,0 €     
- COGS 4.800,0 €-       
Profit from Sales (monthly) 9.200,0 €       
Monthly Sales Chiado
Monthly Sales 45.500,0 €     
- COGS 15.600,0 €-     





The present case study was developed by Bernardo Clode under the supervision of 
Professor Paulo Marcos. It is intended to be used as basis for class discussion and not as an 
endorsement, a source of primary data, or an illustration of effective or ineffective management. 
This case is based on real situations and experiences. 
 
Synopsis 
Paez is an Argentine brand that sells espadrilles. It was brought to Portugal by two 
friends who discovered the brand during an exchange program in Argentina. Paez in Portugal 
had a massive adherence by the consumers even though their main communication channel was 
word of mouth. 
Carlos Coutinho, current CEO of Paez, joined the company with the purpose of helping 
Paez spread by being represented in several selling points around the country with which he 
had already established contact while working as a sales representative at Nike. 
Coutinho in November 2013 opened Paez’s second own store in Lisbon. Although he 
was in doubt about opening the second store in Príncipe Real or in Chiado, he ended up going 
for Príncipe Real - a newly revitalized area that aimed to be a new business cluster in inner 
Lisbon and an entrepreneurial, trendy-chic one. 
Less than a year after, by September 2014, he was forced to make a decision. The store 
in Príncipe Real was slowing down their pace as it wasn’t being able to follow their growth. 
The store wasn’t selling enough and it was clear that it was a matter of location, as their sales 
around the country were increasing at a considerable rhythm. Therefore, they had to go to 
Chiado, the place they had considered as an option before, but hadn’t gone through, because 
they opted for Príncipe Real. Going to Chiado wasn’t arguable, but Coutinho had to decide 
whether they were going to open a new store in Chiado and keep Príncipe Real’s open or move 
Príncipe Real’s store to Chiado. The main concern was if the greater amount of investment on 
keeping both stores open was worth it. And the main danger was if the opening of Chiado’s 
store would steal customers from Príncipe Real. 
He would have to analyze two main things in order to choose the best strategy, the first: 
the consumer behavior, and the consumers’ perceptions in order to know if the consumers from 
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Príncipe Real would be transferrable to Chiado; and the second: if the investment would be 
worth it, by forecasting sales and determining which one would provide more profit for at least 
the next three years. 
 
Literature Review 
The decision of opening a new store or the one of moving a store to another place is in 
fact a determinant factor in a brand’s success. The location of a store can be crucial to reach 
success and the decision making process has to be a balanced one in order not to fail. Start-ups 
incur in riskier decisions because they want to reach success the faster as possible and want to 
differentiate from the other brands. If these decisions lead to success, it’s great, but if they don’t, 
conclusions are taken upon the propensity to risk of the entrepreneurs and their reckless and 
negligent way of approaching risky situations. 
Regarding Paez, we can say they chose the right location in terms of characteristics, but 
they didn’t reflect on the fact that if one place is good it doesn’t mean that an even better one 
doesn’t exist. 
 
Entrepreneurial Decision making 
A dominant theme in entrepreneurship literature is the risk propensity of entrepreneurs 
and the decision making based on that risk prone typical profile of an entrepreneur. 
Corporate managers make weighted decisions, based on all kind of evidence they can 
acquire in order to evaluate the options they have. But entrepreneurs in start-ups tend to not 
even be aware of the risks they face. Entrepreneurs are less likely to recognize risk, and more 
likely to jump into an option without considering the jeopardy it may put them through (Cooper, 
Dunkelberg and Woo 1988). Entrepreneurs have the idea that because they control their recent 
founded companies, they are able to control the uncertainty process, hence not realizing they 
are engaging in risky decisions (Bird 1989). 
Entrepreneurs face risk differently from corporate managers because they don’t perceive 
risk the same way, and that’s the reason why so many entrepreneurs make wrong decisions. 
Not only because they don’t approach risk with due care, but also because they don’t face it as 
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risk as they can’t see through to be aware of the consequences that may arise (Low and 
MacMillan 1988). 
So, in order to understand entrepreneurs and analyze their decision making process and 
conclusions, one must not evaluate the entrepreneurs regarding how prone to risk they are, but 
instead, how they perceive the decisions they make within the business opportunities they 
engage with (Busenitz, 1999). 
 
Store location – business clusters  
When researching the subject of store location, there are lots of studies that prove that 
this is a relevant factor on a company’s success. But most of these studies approach the subject 
on a broader perspective, comparing cities, or comparing rural areas with urban areas. For this 
case study, it is important to approach the subject from a different standpoint, one that is more 
difficult to analyze: comparing a recent commercial area with an established one. 
It is important to note that these commercial areas, are commercial areas for a reason. 
These clusters develop themselves in certain locations of a city for historical reasons or because 
of their location. But these reasons become less explanatory through time, because as the cluster 
develops, it becomes powerful and self-sustainable (Porter 1995). 
Porter (1995) also states that established business clusters in the heart of the cities, as 
Chiado is, benefit from the presence of tourist centers, logistical infrastructures and 
entertainment centers. This because the surroundings of these areas are developed upon the 
existence of an area that attracts people, hence the long run self-sustainability of these clusters. 
But though established business clusters are more attractive, in Paez’s situation, it is 
important to note that a possible relocation of the store is on the table. But it is of utter 
importance to denote that with relocations a lot of, not only tangible, but also intangible costs 
arise. Being these costs the relocation itself – physical costs, such as transportation from one 
site to another – and the possible loss of regular customers from that store, affecting the image 





 SWOT Analysis 
 Marketing STP 
 Consumer behavior and brand’s perception 
 Influence of store location in the success of a brand 
 Entrepreneurial decision making and approach to risk 
 
For a more thorough study and resolution of the case a few additional readings are 
recommended: 
Cooper, A. C., Dunkelberg, W. C., & Woo, C.Y. (1988). Entrepreneurs’ perceived 
chances for success. Journal of Business Venturing, 3, 97-108. 
Bird, B. J. (1989). Entrepreneurial behavior. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. 
Busenitz L., (1999). Entrepreneurial risk and strategic decision making: It’s a matter of 
perspective. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 35, 325–340.  
Low, M. B., & MacMillan, I. C. (1988). Entrepreneurship: Past research and future 
challenges. Journal of Management, 14(2), 139-161.  
Porter, ME (1995). The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, Harvard Business 
Review, 73, 3, 55-71. 
Ghosh, A., & Craig, C. (1983), Formulating Retail Location Strategy in a Changing 
Environment, Journal Of Marketing, 47, 3, 56. 
 
Teaching objectives 
These case study objectives are intended to be reached by studying and solving the case. The 
objectives are: 
 To help students comprehend the inherent risk of decision making and to make them 
aware of the possible future consequences that come along with it. 
 To have students understand the importance of analysing consumer behavior and profile 
in order to better serve their target audience. 
 To highlight the importance of store location strategies and business clusters as a means 
to attain maximum visibility and accessibility. 
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 To have students understand the relevance of thorough analysis when engaging in a 
decision making process. 
 To have students develop the computations with the data provided and reach themselves 
a conclusion on which option to choose. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
Class Discussion Plan 
 The following questions are designed for the students’ better understanding of the case 
and to trigger in-class discussion. The timings designated to each question assume a 90 minute 
class period. 
1. Identify the industries’ main opportunities and threats and Paez’s main strengths and 
weaknesses within this industry. (15 minutes) 
2. How do you define Paez’s positioning? Do you notice a difference between when Paez 
entered the market and when the dilemma took place? Tip: see Exhibit 22, 23 and 24 
(15 minutes) 
3. How would the consumers react to a new store in Chiado? Would Príncipe Real lose 
customers? Would the store in Chiado cannibalize the store in Príncipe Real? Tip: see 
Exhibit 25, 26 and 27 (15 minutes) 
4. Which option was the best in terms of investment? Which one would be more profitable 
for the next 3 years? Compare each option to the original situation. (25 minutes) 
Tip: Compute the NPV (see Exhibit 28) for each situation considering the following: 
 For the option of maintaining Príncipe Real’s store open, Príncipe Real would reduce 
sales by 10% on Year 2 and Year 3 
 For the option of moving the store from Príncipe Real to Chiado, the loss in sales from 
Príncipe Real is considered constant (the same amount they were earning earlier) 
 Sales in Chiado would increase 10% annually 
 14 monthly salaries are paid yearly and are kept constant throughout the years 




5. How do you evaluate the decision of having opened their second store in Príncipe Real 
in 2013? Was the risk taken worth it? Would it have been better to go to Chiado in the 
first place? Discuss whether recent brands/companies have to take such risks or not. Is 
it essential to take riskier decisions in order to make a difference? (20 minutes) 
 
Analysis 
1. Identify the industries’ main opportunities and threats and Paez’s main strengths 
and weaknesses within this industry. 
When elaborating an external analysis of the industry where Paez is inserted, it is important to 
be aware of the difference between the beach footwear segment and the rest of the industry. 
Opportunities 
  The footwear industry from a general perspective has a wide variety of products 
available, but despite the existence of several types of products, there are still not fully explored 
areas, being beach footwear one of those. 
 The beach footwear segment and the espadrilles’ industry specifically face huge growth 
and this is one of the main reasons why Paez is still growing so much every year.  
 The industry is not only growing on a fast pace, it is also being innovative in bringing 
new types of shoes and new types of espadrilles. Portugal, being one of the main producers of 
footwear, invests a lot in innovation and has conditions to embrace footwear companies. 
Threats 
 The fact that the industry is growing brings lots of different solutions to the market, 
hence fiercer competition.  
 The massification of the products can lead to lack of positioning, thus the target becomes 
blurry and this leads to banalization and loses impact on the consumers’ minds. This might 
happen due to the excessively fast growth that can lead to the “need” of massification – because 







  Paez has a brand image and brand values that captivate the consumers, the fact that the 
brand is associated to a relaxed yet simple environment and image (see Exhibit 6) makes the 
consumers loyal to the brand (see Exhibit 14). 
  The price practiced by Paez is also, in comparison to other brands, relatively low, if we 
take quality into consideration (see Exhibit 17). 
 Paez also benefits from a first-mover advantage, having grown enough in the first few 
years to be already well established when competitors appeared. 
Weaknesses 
 Although Paez is being quite successful, it may still be considered as a weakness the 
fact that the founders have little or no previous experience as managers, and this can be 
translated into naivety and amateurism. 
 The seasonality of the product is also frightening. Paez doesn’t have many solutions for 
the cold seasons and the fact that the espadrilles aren’t used during these seasons is not related 
to perception, but to the characteristics of the espadrille itself. 
 Paez relies on its image and values to be the market leader, but as the industry is 
growing, this could much be torn apart if new brands come with different approaches and 
innovations. 
 
2. How do you define Paez’s positioning? Do you notice a difference between when 
Paez entered the market and when the dilemma took place?  
Tip: see Exhibit 22, 23 and 24 
The consumers’ perception of Paez’s espadrille has had a positive breakthrough. When 
Paez introduced its espadrille in Portugal, it was perceived as an item to take to the beach as it 
was easy to put on and take off and it was comfortable. As mentioned in the case, Ramos stated: 
“When we entered the market, I believe people thought Paez were too comfortable to be used 
on a daily basis”. 
The consumers are now perceiving Paez differently as 48% of them buy Paez to use on 
a daily basis. Although 45.1% are still buying Paez’s espadrilles to take to the beach, there’s 
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already an even larger segment of consumers that are seeing them as a day-to-day shoe (see 
Exhibit 22). 
And by comparing the characteristics people value the most when buying beach 
footwear with the characteristics people value the most when buying espadrilles, it is perceived 
that the ease of putting on/taking off loses a lot of weight. Regarding beach footwear, 45% of 
the people ranked “ease of putting on/taking off” first or second in this rank question. And when 
buying espadrilles, only 26% of the people care that much about this characteristic (see 
Exhibits 23 and 24). 
This proves that the espadrilles are losing this association to beach footwear, hence 
reinforcing the idea that Paez espadrilles are being perceived as day-to-day shoes. 
 
3. How would the consumers react to a new store in Chiado? Would Príncipe Real 
lose customers? Would the store in Chiado cannibalize the store in Príncipe Real? 
Tip: see exhibits 25, 26 and 27 
As referred in the case, Príncipe Real is a recent commercial area as it has been recently 
revitalized to serve such purposes. As opposed to Chiado, an old, well established commercial 
site. 
When deciding whether to open a third store or to move Príncipe Real’s store to Chiado, 
it is important to evaluate and analyze the possibility of Chiado’s store cannibalizing the sales 
of Príncipe Real’s. This is relevant because the option of opening a third store might be 
disregarded if the profit isn’t only incremental, meaning, it might be disregarded if the decision 
doesn’t only go through computing and comparing the initial investment, but also the long-term 
return on having both stores open. 
Through the survey conducted by the case author, it is possible to analyze the 
preferences of the consumers regarding the store location, specifically between Príncipe Real 
and Chiado. 
In the survey people had two answer how frequently they go to Príncipe Real and - in 
case they didn’t answer “never” - they had to rank the reasons that motivate their trips. They 
had to rank the following: for a walk, lunch/dinner/have a drink, shopping and work. The same 




Through the surveyed people’s answers, it was possible to reach a conclusion regarding 
the cannibalization that keeping both stores open would cause. 
By cross referencing questions, it was possible to acknowledge that 63,5% of the people  
that go to Chiado, go there primarily to shop (see Exhibit 25). This shows us that Chiado is 
perceived as a commercial site, and the majority of the people that go to Chiado, go there to 
shop. 
In opposition, if we analyze Príncipe Real in terms of the general consumers’ perception, 
we reach the conclusion that it hasn’t, at least yet, reached its desired awareness as a commercial 
area. Only 24,6% of the people that go to Príncipe Real, go there to shop (see Exhibit 26) 
The comparison of these two charts – Exhibit 25 and 26 - tells us that Chiado is way 
more established as a commercial area, and lets us undertake that with Príncipe Real’s store, 
Paez’s would reach much less clients than with a store in Chiado. 
But in order to draw conclusions about the cannibalization to which maintaining both 
stores open could lead, it is important to analyze if people that usually go to Príncipe Real to 
shop would go to Chiado instead. In order to know the percentage of people that would make 
this change – from Príncipe Real to Chiado. 
If we take a look at Exhibit 27, we conclude that 78,4% of the people that go to Príncipe 
Real with a shopping purpose go to Chiado with the same purpose. This means that the current 
shoppers in Príncipe Real are used to shopping in Chiado, therefore we can say they are 
transferrable from one place to the other. 
From all this we deduce that, of the 25% of people that go to Príncipe Real to shop, 
around 78% would be able to be transferred to Chiado, thus cannibalization is likely to occur. 
We can, then, conclude that the majority of the consumers, if presented with the two options – 




4. Which option was the best in terms of investment? Which one would be more 
profitable for the next 3 years? Compare each option to the their original situation 
Tip: Compute the NPV for each situation considering the following: 
 For the option of maintaining Príncipe Real’s store open, Príncipe Real would reduce 
sales by 50% on Year 1 and by 10% on Year 2 and Year 3 
 For the option of moving the store from Príncipe Real to Chiado, the loss in sales from 
Príncipe Real is considered constant (the same amount they were earning earlier) 
 Sales in Chiado would increase 10% annually 
 14 monthly salaries are paid yearly and are kept constant throughout the years 
 Discount rate = 10% 
 
To develop this financial analysis it is important to gather the right information, in order 
to be able to build the cash flows table for each situation and consequently compute the NPV’s. 
This information is given throughout the case and is also present in the exhibits. 
In order to compute the cash flows, we need to first calculate the costs and profits. To 
make things less complicated, as we have the necessary data, we can separate the fixed costs 
from the variable costs by computing the fixed costs and then directly computing the profit 
from sales. And by subtracting the fixed costs to the profit from sales, we’ll have the cash flows. 
So, firstly the fixed costs must be calculated for each situation. For that, the students 
need to look at the fixed costs for each situation (Exhibit 20 and 21) and compute them for the 
next three years, considering that only the rents and the employees’ salaries are paid in year 1, 
2 and 3. Because the other elements are considered initial investment (year 0). 
They then have to multiply the monthly rents by 12 to calculate the value per year and 
the monthly salaries by 14 for the same reason (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
Table 1 
Incurred costs Values Year 0 Year 1 Following
Renovations 50.000 €       50.000 €       -  €              -  €              
Furniture 20.000 €       20.000 €       -  €              -  €              
Exhibitors 5.000 €          5.000 €          -  €              -  €              
Chiado's Rent (monthly) 3.000 €          -  €              36.000 €       36.000 €       
Employees Chiado (monthly) 4.400 €          -  €              61.600 €       61.600 €       





The fixed costs are already calculated for each situation. The students, then, have to 
calculate the profit from sales for year 1, 2 and 3. For that they need the current monthly sales 
for each store (Exhibit 28). By applying the yearly 10% increase in Chiado’s sales and the 
increase loss of 10% for Príncipe Real for the option of “Opening a 3rd store”, we reach the total 
profit from sales for each year. And in the option of “Moving Store” they need to subtract the 
profit from sales of Príncipe Real that keeps constant, as Paez would lose the total profit from 





After this, we’re ready to calculate the yearly cash flows for each situation, by 
subtracting the costs to the profits from sales (see Table 5 and Table 6). 
Table 5 
 
Incurred costs Values Year 0 Year 1 Following
Renovations 50.000 €       50.000 €       -  €              -  €              
Transportation 1.000 €          1.000 €          -  €              -  €              
+ Chiado's rent (monthly) 3.000 €          -  €              36.000 €       36.000 €       
- P. Real's Rent (monthly) 950 €-             -  €              11.400 €       11.400 €       
Employees Chiado (monthly) 4.400 €          -  €              61.600 €       61.600 €       
- Employees Príncipe Real (monthly) 2.200 €-          -  €              30.800 €       30.800 €       
Total 51.000 €       139.800 €     139.800 €     
Moving store
Profit from sales (monthly) Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Sales Chiado -  €              25.300 €       27.830 €       30.613 €       
- Reduction in sales Principe Real -  €              4.600 €-          5.060 €-          5.566 €-          
Total -  €              20.700 €       22.770 €       25.047 €       
Opening 3rd store
Profit from sales (monthly) Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Chiado -  €              29.900 €       32.890 €       36.179 €       
- Príncipe Real -  €              9.200 €-          9.200 €-          9.200 €-          
Total -  €              20.700 €       23.690 €       26.979 €       
Moving store
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Profit From Sales -  €              248.400 €     273.240 €     300.564 €     
- Fixed Costs 75.000 €-       97.600 €-       97.600 €-       97.600 €-       








With the cash flows we can calculate an NPV to determine which of the options would 
bring more value to Paez, hence which of the options would be more worthy of investment. 
To compute the NPV, each cash flow has to be discounted to the present date with a discount 
rate of 10% (see Table 7 and Table 8). 
      Table 7               Table 8 
   
By this, we can conclude that the most appropriate option would be that of moving the 
store from Príncipe Real to Chiado as it would add more value to the company, thus being the 
one in which investing would be more intelligent. 
 
5. How do you evaluate the decision of having opened their second store in Príncipe Real 
in 2013? Was the risk taken worth it? Would it have been better to go to Chiado in the 
first place? Discuss whether recent brands/companies have to take such risks or not. 
Is it essential to take riskier decisions in order to make a difference? Should a more 
restrained approach have been taken? 
 
In 2013 Paez decided to open a new store. They wanted to make themselves present at 
a centre of commerce, a place where there was a high influx of people shopping and passing 
by. They wanted to benefit from not only the visibility, but also of the benefits that come with 
being at one of these business clusters (Porter 1995). 
The main commercial area in inner Lisbon is Chiado. It is the place where there are 
more concentrated stores having 43500 m2 of occupied area for street commerce (see Exhibit 
19). 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Sales - Variable Costs -  €              248.400 €     284.280 €     323.748 €     
- Fixed Costs 51.000 €-       139.800 €-     139.800 €-     139.800 €-     








When deciding where to open the new store in 2013, Paez’s partners considered going 
either to Chiado or to Príncipe Real. Príncipe Real was considered because it was an area that 
was being revitalized from a commercial standpoint. Efforts had been made to transform 
Príncipe Real into a new business cluster, a new area like Chiado; East Bank bought around 20 
buildings in Príncipe Real in order to revitalize the area. But they had several differentiation 
factors from the already established commercial areas, such as Chiado; they had differentiated 
themselves by focusing on developing an entrepreneurial, trendy-chic area filled with 
Portuguese innovation. This was appealing for Paez because they fitted the profile and they 
wanted to gain advantage towards competitors by being associated to this new concept and to 
this new area. 
When evaluating both options back in 2013, they addressed the situation as the 
following: either they differentiated by being involved in something new, something that was 
growing (see Exhibit 7), or they would go to a more certain option by installing their new store 
in Chiado, an already developed and well known commercial area. 
Cooper, Dunkelberg and Woo (1988) stated that entrepreneurs often decide without 
considering the jeopardy their option may put them through. Even though they considered both 
options when deciding, they only perceived their risk as losing from not choosing the other 
option. They should have thought in advance about the decisions they would have to make if, 
in fact, Príncipe Real ended up not providing them the advantage they felt they were going to 
attain by opening their new store there.  
This decision of engaging in this endeavour trying to attain differentiation by going to 
Príncipe Real, as seen, led them to a position where they were forced to open a store in Chiado 
after all. Paez’s partners didn’t have the sensitivity to realize that the risk they were putting 
themselves through could have later consequences, they didn’t approach the risk with the 
needed care because they faced it only as an option and not as risk (Low and MacMillan 1988). 
After the situation occurred and taking into consideration that the experience with the 
store in Príncipe Real didn’t roll out as expected, it is pretty clear that the best option was to go 
to Chiado. But although entrepreneurs have this uneducated approach to risk, it is important to 
denote that there were some barriers for Paez to go to Chiado in the first place. Going to Chiado 
was, in fact, the best option, but not only the rents were higher, which can be translated in a 
greater amount of cost on the long run, but also the fact that they were still a somewhat small 
company could harm them amidst such companies and brands that are represented there. 
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In the end it is important to evaluate the whole situation with a holistic approach and 
from an external standpoint. The problem in this decision making process by Paez’s partners 
wasn’t exactly the fact that they made a bad decision and that now things went bad for them. 
The problem resides on the approach to risk that these decision makers took, it resides on the 
fact that they didn’t consider all the opportunity costs and actual costs they would have to incur 
in, by choosing either option. 
Entrepreneurs in general have to engage in risky endeavours. It is necessary to do so in 
order to thrive and to be able to attain the results they want. Busenitz (1999) says that to 
understand entrepreneurs’ actions and decisions, one must not evaluate their risk propensity, 
but instead the lack of efficiency in their analysis, or ultimately the lack of analysis of the 
situations they’re faced with. 
